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Abstract
Background This study aimed to identify the frequency
of events in the different patient safety risk domains during
minimally invasive surgery (MIS) and conventional sur-
gery (CS).
Methods A convenience sample of gynecologic MIS and
CS was observed. Events were observed and categorized
into one of the predeﬁned patient safety risk domains.
Results A total of 53 procedures were observed: 26 CS
and 27 MIS procedures. The general characteristics were
comparable between the two groups. A large number of
environmental events were observed, averaging one every
2.5 min. Technical events and events of an organizational
nature occurred more often in MIS (P\0.01) than in CS
(P\0.01). The relative risk for the occurrence of one or
more technical events in MIS compared with CS was 1.7,
and the risk for two or more technical events was 4.1. A
time out according to protocol showed no relationship to
the occurrence of the different types of patient safety-
related events.
Conclusion The technological complexity inherent in
MIS makes this type of surgery more prone to technology-
related problems than CS, even in a specially designed
minimally invasive surgical suite. A regular time-out pro-
cedure developed for CS lacks the attention necessary for
the complex technology used in MIS and therefore is
insufﬁcient for MIS procedures brieﬁng. Incorporating a
specially designed technology checklist in a regular brief-
ing protocol could be a solution to decrease the number of
events in MIS.
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Ever since the Harvard medical practice study and the
report by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), To Err Is
Human: Building a Safer Health System, that followed it,
patient safety has become a major focus of improvement in
health care. As is widely known, an estimate stated by the
IOM alleged that 44,000–98,000 patients die every year in
the United States due to medical errors [1].
In the Netherlands, the results of a national study
assessing the number of hospital adverse events were
presented in 2007. This study showed that 5.7% of
1.3 million patients admitted in 2004 encountered an
adverse event. For 40% of these patients, the adverse event
probably could have been prevented [2]. This high per-
centage of preventability is conﬁrmed in a systematic
review [3] including eight studies with a total of 74,485
patients. The median incidence of hospital adverse events
reported in this study was 9.2%, and the median percentage
of preventability was reported to be 43.5%. Of these hos-
pital adverse events, 39.6% were operating room (OR)
related.
In 2007, the report by the Dutch inspectorate of health
care [4] emphasized that the complexity of minimally
invasive surgery (MIS) further increases risks in patient
safety. However, the mechanism whereby patient safety in
MIS is more compromised than in conventional surgery
(CS) remains unclear. To understand this mechanism,
differences in patient safety between the two types of
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and Other Interventional Techniques surgery should be investigated according to the systems
approach. This approach to quality and safety in surgery is
required to obtain insight into causes of errors and has a
much larger effect on patient safety than the person
approach [5].
Several important studies have suggested frameworks of
factors that inﬂuence patient safety based on the systems
approach [6–8]. These frameworks were adapted to explain
patient safety during surgery in terms of several risk
domains and measurable quality outcome parameters
(Fig. 1). This observational study aimed to identify dif-
ferences in patient safety risk factors between MIS and CS
according to the systems approach.
Material and methods
Case selection
A convenience sample of gynecologic MIS and CS per-
formed at the Leiden University Medical Center, the
Netherlands, was observed. During the study, CS per-
formed in an OR with regular OR settings was observed.
Only MIS procedures performed in minimally invasive
surgical suites especially designed for laparoscopy (in this
case, OR-1, Karl Storz) were included because these suites
were especially designed to facilitate MIS [9, 10].
In this study, MIS comprised only laparoscopies and
was stratiﬁed based on the level of difﬁculty according to
the guidelines of the Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (RCOG) [11]. The RCOG levels range
from level 1 procedures, which are basic laparoscopic
procedures (e.g., diagnostic laparoscopy and sterilization),
to level 3 procedures, which are advanced laparoscopic
procedures (e.g., total laparoscopic hysterectomy). The
procedures that could not be classiﬁed as MIS were cate-
gorized as CS.
Categorization system
The adapted framework, which explains patient safety in
terms of several risk domains and measurable quality
outcome parameters (Fig. 1), was the basis for the obser-
vations in this study. For an objective assessment of the
risk domains in the framework, every risk domain should
be quantiﬁed. This quantiﬁcation and further categorization
of the observations is explained in Table 1.
The categorization was tested in a pilot study during a
period of 3 weeks. During this pilot study, random gyne-
cologic surgical procedures were observed according to the
categorization. After every procedure, individual surgical
team members evaluated the procedure with the researcher
to determine the feasibility of the categorization.
Next, the categorization was critically reviewed for
clinical relevance and completeness by a board of three
independent experts (all authorities in the ﬁeld of patient
safety and MIS representing the department of surgery,
gynecology, and patient safety in general). The ﬁnal cate-
gorization system, shown in Table 1, comprised a number
of risk domains that had to be quantiﬁed during the
observations (e.g., social interaction, technology, safe-
guarding system, organization, and environment). This was
achieved by observing the number of events that could be
categorized in these risk domains.
Risk domains influenceable by policy
￿ Surgical team
￿ Social interaction
￿ Technology
￿ Organizational factors
￿ Safeguarding system
￿ Environmental factors
Risk domains not influenceable by policy
￿ Patient characteristics
￿ Complexity of surgery
Input
Measurable quality parameters
￿ Performed surgery
￿ Intraoperative complications
￿ Postoperative complications
￿ Amount of bloodloss
￿ Procedure time 
Output
Risk domains influenceable by policy
￿ Surgical team
￿ Social interaction
￿ Technology
￿ Organizational factors
￿ Safeguarding system
￿ Environmental factors
Risk domains not influenceable by policy
￿ Patient characteristics
￿ Complexity of surgery
Measurable quality parameters
￿ Performed surgery
￿ Intraoperative complications
￿ Postoperative complications
￿ Amount of bloodloss
￿ Procedure time 
Fig. 1 Framework of risk
domains explaining patient
safety in surgery according to a
systems approach
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Events were deﬁned as occurrences that potentially
increase risks and thus compromise patient safety, either
directly or indirectly.
Observations
Observation of events during a surgical procedure started
with the time out and ended when the last suture was
placed. The total observational time (from time out until
the last suture) and the total procedure time (from ﬁrst
incisions until last suture) were recorded. Furthermore, the
risk domains not quantiﬁed by events and the other out-
come parameters of the procedure were recorded as deﬁned
in Table 1.
Data collection
Data collection was performed by an independent observer
who had not been involved in the development of the
categorization to ensure objective assessment of the risk
domains. This observer was required to have ample
knowledge of medical processes but no knowledge of the
speciﬁc procedures that had to be observed. Therefore, a
medical student with 4 years of medical training was
selected to be the observer.
The observer attended gynecologic surgical procedures
during a training period of 3 weeks before the study to
obtain familiarity with these procedures. During this per-
iod, the observer learned to recognize deviations from
standard procedure as events and to code events according
to the categorization.
Data analysis
All data were analyzed with the SPSS 16.0 software
package (SPSS, Chicago, IL, USA). Differences in fre-
quency of events, experience of surgical team members,
and length of surgery between MIS and CS were assessed
with the independent samples t-test. Differences in cate-
gorical data (e.g., patient characteristics) were assessed
with the chi-square test.
Results
General characteristics
A total of 53 procedures were observed: 26 CS and 27 MIS
procedures. The CS comprised 5 laparotomies for a benign
Table 1 Framework to which observations are categorized
Risk domain Inﬂuencing factor Observation (quantity)
Input
Surgical team Knowledge and
experience of
individual team
member
Experience of every
individual team member
deﬁned as the estimated
number of similar
procedures previously
performed
Social
interaction
Verbal and nonverbal
communication
Events concerning verbal
miscommunication
Teamwork Events concerning
teamwork
Technology Availability and
functioning of
equipment and
instruments
Events concerning the
presence or correct
positioning of
instruments or
equipment
Events concerning the
functioning of
instruments or
equipment
Organization Stafﬁng and planning Adequate scheduling
Adequate stafﬁng
Availability of
recourses
Availability of supplies
Availability of
technological items
Safeguarding
system
Compliance of
policies adapted for
patient safety
Correct execution of the
time-out procedure
Environment Case-irrelevant
disturbing factors
Door movements
Telephone calls
Pager calls
Radio use
Case-irrelevant
conversation
Patient
characteristics
Condition of the
patient
ASA score
BMI
Complexity of
surgery
Difﬁculty level of the
surgery
MIS: type of procedure
that can be categorized
in RCOG levels
CS: type of procedure
Output
Performed
procedure
Was the procedure
performed as intended?
Intraoperative
complication
Did intraoperative
complications occur?
Postoperative
complication
Postoperative
complications up to
6 weeks afterward
Blood loss Amount of blood loss
Procedure time Total observational and
intraoperative procedure
time
ASA American society of anesthesiologists; BMI body mass index;
MIS minimally invasive surgery; RCOG Royal college of obstetricians
and gynecologists; CS conventional surgery
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123indication, 5 laparotomies for a malignant indication, 9
vaginal hysterectomies including 4 combined with prolapse
surgery, 6 vulva surgeries, and 1 cervical procedure. The
MIS comprised 10 RCOG level 1 procedures, 11 level two
procedures, and 6 level three procedures.
Both the mean total observational time and the mean
total procedure time were comparable between MIS (1 h
29 min vs. 1 h 52 min) and CS (1 h 19 min vs. 1 h
44 min). The mean experience of the surgical team mem-
bers did not differ between MIS and CS. The body mass
indexes (BMI) and the American society of anesthesiology
(ASA) scores of the patients were both comparable
between MIS and CS (Table 2).
Events
The total counts of observed events are displayed in
Table 2. Between 75 and 100% of the events occurred
intraoperatively, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The greatest
number of observed events were categorized under envi-
ronment (MIS 90% vs. CS 97%). Of these events, door
movements were observed most: MIS 81% (n = 925)
versus CS 80% (n = 1,275). All observed events were
checked for a correlation with the length of surgery, which
was found for telephone calls (R
2 = 0.71) and door
movements (R
2 = 0.74). One door movement occurred
every 154 s in MIS compared with one every 140 s in CS,
and one telephone call occurred every 20 min in both MIS
and CS. All environmental events combined showed an
average of one event observed every 125 s during MIS and
one observed every 111 s during CS. Of these observed
environmental events, 8.8% were noted as disturbing by
the surgeon in MIS compared with 17.6% in CS.
MIS versus CS
The comparative frequencies of the different types of
events in MIS and CS showed no difference between
environmental and social events except for disturbance of
Table 2 Count of events during
the total observational time
MIS minimally invasive
surgery; CS conventional
surgery; Count total count of all
procedures; Max count highest
count reached during one
procedure; Mean per procedure
(count divided by number of
procedures) if no correlation
was found between count and
procedure time; NS not
signiﬁcant
a Per minute if a correlation
was found between count and
procedure time (count divided
by procedure time)
MIS (n = 27) CS (n = 26) Total MIS vs CS
Count Max
count
Mean Count Max
count
Mean P value
Environmental
Total 1,145 114 0.48
a 1,594 208 0.54
a 2739 NS
Door movements 925 90 0.39
a 1,275 174 0.43
a 1812 NS
Telephone 112 11 0.05
a 165 28 0.05
a 268 NS
Beeper 41 8 1.52 77 13 2.96 118 NS
Radio 9 2 0.33 20 2 0.77 29 \0.01
Case-irrelevant conversation 58 11 2.15 57 9 2.19 115 NS
Technical
Total 69 8 2.56 18 3 0.69 87 \0.01
Equipment 45 6 1.67 11 2 0.42 56 \0.01
Instruments 24 2 0.89 7 3 0.12 31 \0.01
Social
Total 43 9 1.59 27 8 1.04 70 NS
Communication 34 7 1.26 22 7 0.85 56 NS
Teamwork 9 2 0.33 5 1 0.19 14 NS
Organizational
Total 13 3 0.48 0 0 0.00 13 \0.01
Fig. 2 Total counts of observed events in minimally invasive surgery
(MIS) and conventional surgery (CS). The striped part represents the
share of events that occurred pre- or postoperatively, and the white
part represents the share of events that occurred intraoperatively
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123the radio, which was noted more often during CS
(P\0.01). Technical events and events of an organiza-
tional nature occurred more often during MIS (P\0.01)
than during CS (P\0.01) (Table 2).
Among all the events of a technical nature observed
during MIS, 49% (n = 34) were problems with the posi-
tioning of equipment or instruments. Problems with the
functioning of equipment or instruments accounted for
28% of these events (n = 19).
In CS, 33% (n = 6) of the observed events of a tech-
nical nature were positional and 28% (n = 5) were prob-
lems with functioning. Among the 13 problems of an
organizational nature observed during MIS, 8 involved the
unavailability of instruments at the time of surgery. The
other organizational problems were a result of inadequate
stafﬁng.
Relative risk
The relative risk calculated for the occurrence of one or
more events of a technical nature in MIS compared with
CS was 1.7. The relative risk of having two or more
technical problems during MIS versus CS was 4.1. For
organizational problems, the relative risk could not be
calculated because none occurred during CS.
Time out
The time-out protocol used in the observed clinic was
similar to the time-out protocol developed by the World
Health Organization (WHO) [12]. In 74% of the MIS
procedures, the time out proceeded according to this pro-
tocol compared with 50% of the CS procedures. One MIS
procedure and ﬁve CS procedures had no time out at all.
However, no relation between a time-out procedure
according to the protocol and the occurrence of different
types of patient safety-related events was observed.
Discussion
Differences in patient safety-related events between CS
and MIS can be explained by the use of advanced tech-
nology as an essential part of MIS. This is consistent with
the statement made by the Dutch Inspectorate of health
care that the (technical) complexity of MIS further
increases risks in patient safety compared with CS. A
previous study has already shown that a great number of
technical events tend to occur during laparoscopic proce-
dures. In fact, in 87% (26 of 30) of the observed laparo-
scopic procedures, one or more incidents with technical
equipment (n = 46) or instruments (n = 9) occurred [13].
Surgeons may be aware of the implications of new
technology for patient safety. However, to our knowledge,
the consequences of technology for events that occur in the
OR have never been described. Our data show that the
majority of the organizational events (62%) also were
technology related. More speciﬁcally, they were related to
the preparation for the technological aspect of MIS
(missing instruments or equipment). Altogether, it appears
to be particularly the advanced technology added to sur-
gery that hinders patient safety in MIS compared with CS.
Although studies prove that general brieﬁng checklists
reduce morbidity and mortality in surgery [12, 14], the
results of the current study suggest that for MIS a different
approach is required. The fact that a time out according to
protocol is not correlated with a lower frequency of events
leads us to speculate that a general brieﬁng procedure such
as the WHO checklist is insufﬁcient for the preparation for
MIS.
Because the most important difference in events
between MIS and CS is in the frequency of technology-
related events, more attention is needed for technology
during the brieﬁng. An adequate solution already shown to
reduce the number of technical events in MIS is the use of
a standardized checklist especially designed for MIS [15].
Such a checklist could be incorporated into the general
WHO brieﬁng for MIS cases.
In the current study, an astonishing number of envi-
ronmental events occurred about every 2 min in both MIS
and CS. These events consisted primarily of door move-
ments (one very 2.5 min) with the potential risk of surgi-
cal-site infections.
High frequencies of door movements have been reported
previously, namely, 13–316 times per surgery (5–87 per
recorded hour) [16]. Similar to the ﬁndings of the current
study, the observed door movements increased in direct
proportion to the length of surgery and also were related to
the number of persons in the OR. It is remarkable that the
bulk of environmental events were not observed to be
disturbing or distracting to the senior surgeon because
8.8% of all the observed environmental events combined
were disturbing in MIS compared with 17.6% in CS. The
reason for this could be that experienced surgeons have
learned to block distracting events and remain concentrated
[17] and that most environmental events do not occur
during critical moments.
However, the effect of environmental events should not
be underestimated. Especially the performance of inexpe-
rienced surgeons or residents could be inﬂuenced by dis-
traction, as shown in a previous study [18].
Findings have shown that social factors such as com-
munication and teamwork are important risk factors in
patient safety. In fact, optimizing teamwork to reduce error
354 Surg Endosc (2012) 26:350–356
123stands as the basis of a whole new era of research: crew
resource management.
Communication difﬁculties previously have been
reported to occur in approximately 30% of team exchanges
[19]. About one third of the communication failures
resulted in visible effects that could inﬂuence patient safety
[20]. In the current study, however, the frequency of the
observed social events was very low compared with that
described in previous reports. The most obvious reason
could be an underestimation of the true quantity of these
events. The previously published studies focused only on
communication (or teamwork) events, also reporting small
social mishaps, whereas the current study focused also on
technical, organizational, and environmental events. The
social events reported in this study needed to be promi-
nently present and therefore more prone to inﬂuence safety
than small social mishaps, which might not have had any
inﬂuence at all. Furthermore, because observations of both
MIS and CS were done by the same observer, a comparable
(under)estimation is to be expected for both types of sur-
gery, and a relative comparison remains possible. Hence, it
can be stated that is no difference exists in the number of
observed events of a social nature between MIS and CS.
Another observational study investigated different types
of surgical ﬂow disruptions during cardiac surgery, show-
ing that the greatest number of observed surgical ﬂow
disruptions were of a social nature (52%) [21]. This is in
contrast to our observations in MIS, indicating that the
highest percentage of events are disturbing environmental
events (44.7%), followed by events of a technical nature
(30.5%). Events of a social nature accounted for only 19%
of the observed events. In CS, the highest percentage of
observed events were disturbing environmental events
(86.2%) followed by events of a social nature (8.3%).
Technical events during cardiac surgery accounted for
5.5% of the events. Hence, the outcome is highly procedure
dependent.
A pitfall of all observational studies is observational bias.
We attempted to reduce observational bias by selecting an
independent researcher to perform the observations. Ideally,
more than one observer should have observed all proce-
dures to test for interrater agreement. However, this would
have crowded the OR because the observations were done
in an academic hospital where professionals in training
(students, nurses, interns, and residents) also attend surgical
procedures, and more observers would not have been in the
interest of patient safety. Furthermore, it is well recognized
that the Hawthorne effect (awareness of being observed
alters the way a person behaves) [22] takes place. Taking
this into consideration, the most accurate method for per-
forming observations of surgical procedures probably is
with some sort of black box in which video and audio
recordings are made. With this approach, less inﬂuence of
the Hawthorne effect and multiple independent observa-
tions would be possible.
Conclusion
A large number of events have been observed during both
MIS and CS. The technological complexity inherent in
MIS makes this type of surgery more prone to technology-
related events than CS, even in a specially designed min-
imally invasive surgical suite. A regular time-out procedure
as used for CS lacks the necessary attention for the com-
plex technology used in MIS and is therefore insufﬁcient
for MIS procedures brieﬁng. Incorporating a specially
designed technology checklist into a regular brieﬁng pro-
tocol could be a solution to decrease the number of events
in MIS.
Acknowledgments The authors thank D. D. Rodrigues for the
technical support. They thank all the gynecologists, anesthesia per-
sonnel, and OR nurses who assisted during the observed procedures at
the Leiden University Medical Center for their input, cooperation, and
support during the observation period.
Disclosures Sharon P. Rodrigues, Aurystella M. Wever, Jenny
Dankelman, and Frank-Willem Jansen have no conﬂicts of interest or
ﬁnancial ties to disclose.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which per-
mits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
References
1. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldsen MS (1999) To err is human:
building a safer health system. National Academy Press,
Washington
2. De Bruijne MC, Zegers M, Hoonhout LH, Wagner C (2007) On-
bedoelde schade in Nederlandse ziekenhuizen. Dossieronderzoek
van ziekenhuisopnames in 2004. EMGO Instituut/VUmc en
NIVEL, Amsterdam/Utrecht
3. de Vries EN, Ramrattan MA, Smorenburg SM, Gouma DJ,
Boermeester MA (2008) The incidence and nature of in-hospital
adverse events: a systematic review. Qual Saf Health Care
3:216–223
4. Inspectie voor de gezondheidszorg (2007) Risico’s minimaal
invasieve chirurgie onderschat, kwaliteitssysteem voor laparo-
scopische operaties ontbreekt. IGZ, Den Haag
5. Dankelman J, Grimbergen CA (2005) Systems approach to
reduce errors in surgery. Surg Endosc 8:1017–1021
6. Calland JF, Guerlain S, Adams RB, Tribble CG, Foley E, Chekan
EG (2002) A systems approach to surgical safety. Surg Endosc
6:1005–1014
7. Vincent C, Moorthy K, Sarker SK, Chang A, Darzi AW (2004)
Systems approaches to surgical quality and safety: from concept
to measurement. Ann Surg 4:475–482
8. Leake PA, Urbach DR (2010) Measuring processes of care in
general surgery: assessment of technical and nontechnical skills.
Surg Innov 17(4):332–339
Surg Endosc (2012) 26:350–356 355
1239. Herron DM, Gagner M, Kenyon TL, Swanstrom LL (2001) The
minimally invasive surgical suite enters the 21st century: a dis-
cussion of critical design elements. Surg Endosc 4:415–422
10. Kenyon TA, Urbach DR, Speer JB, Waterman-Hukari B, Foraker
GF, Hansen PD, Swanstrom LL (2001) Dedicated minimally
invasive surgery suites increase operating room efﬁciency. Surg
Endosc 10:1140–1143
11. Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1994) Report
of the RCOG working party on training in gynaecological
endoscopic surgery. RCOG, London
12. Haynes AB, Weiser TG, Berry WR, Lipsitz SR, Breizat AH,
Dellinger EP, Herbosa T, Joseph S, Kibatala PL, Lapitan MC,
Merry AF, Moorthy K, Reznick RK, Taylor B, Gawande AA
(2009) A surgical safety checklist to reduce morbidity and mor-
tality in a global population. N Engl J Med 360(5):491–499
13. Verdaasdonk EG, Stassen LP, van der Elst M, Karsten TM,
Dankelman J (2007) Problems with technical equipment during
laparoscopic surgery: an observational study. Surg Endosc 2:
275–279
14. de Vries EN, Prins HA, Crolla RM, den Outer AJ, van Andel G,
van Helden SH, Schlack WS, van Putten MA, Gouma DJ,
Dijkgraaf MG, Smorenburg SM, Boermeester MA (2010) Effect
of a comprehensive surgical safety system on patient outcomes.
N Engl J Med 20:1928–1937
15. Verdaasdonk EG, Stassen LP, Hoffmann WF, van der Elst M,
Dankelman J (2008) Can a structured checklist prevent problems
with laparoscopic equipment? Surg Endosc 10:2238–2243
16. Lynch RJ, Englesbe MJ, Sturm L, Bitar A, Budhiraj K, Kolla S,
Polyachenko Y, Duck MG, Campbell DA Jr (2009) Measurement
of foot trafﬁc in the operating room: implications for infection
control. Am J Med Qual 1:45–52
17. Moorthy K, Munz Y, Undre S, Darzi A (2004) Objective eval-
uation of the effect of noise on the performance of a complex
laparoscopic task. Surgery 1:25–30
18. Pluyter JR, Buzink SN, Rutkowski AF, Jakimowicz JJ (2010)
Do absorption and realistic distraction inﬂuence performance of
component task surgical procedure? Surg Endosc 4:902–907
19. Lingard L, Regehr G, Espin S, Whyte S (2006) A theory-based
instrument to evaluate team communication in the operating
room: balancing measurement authenticity and reliability. Qual
Saf Health Care 6:422–426
20. Lingard L, Espin S, Whyte S, Regehr G, Baker GR, Reznick R,
Bohnen J, Orser B, Doran D, Grober E (2004) Communication
failures in the operating room: an observational classiﬁcation of
recurrent types and effects. Qual Saf Health Care 5:330–334
21. Wiegmann DA, ElBardissi AW, Dearani JA, Daly RC, Sundt TM
III (2007) Disruptions in surgical ﬂow and their relationship
to surgical errors: an exploratory investigation. Surgery 5:
658–665
22. Parsons HM (1974) What happened at Hawthorne? New evidence
suggests the Hawthorne effect resulted from operant reinforce-
ment contingencies. Science 4128:922–932
356 Surg Endosc (2012) 26:350–356
123